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Nowadays, most users need more passwords than they can han-
dle. Consequently, users have developed a multitude of strategies
to cope with this situation. Some of these coping strategies are
based on misconceptions about password security. In such cases,
the users are unaware of their insecure password practices. Ad-
dressing the misconceptions is vital in order to decrease insecure
coping strategies. We conducted a systematic literature review with
the goal to provide an overview of the misconceptions about pass-
word security. Our literature review revealed that misconceptions
exist in basically all aspects of password security. Furthermore, we
developed interventions to address these misconceptions. Then, we
evaluated the interventions’ effectiveness in decreasing the miscon-
ceptions at three small and medium sized enterprises (SME). Our
results show that the interventions decrease the overall prevalence
of misconceptions significantly in the participating employees.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Text passwords are ubiquitously used to authenticate users, be it
online or offline. Yet, many users face problems when choosing, han-
dling, or remembering their text passwords [15, 16, 28]. As a result,
users have developed a variety of coping strategies. Some of these
coping strategies can be beneficial, e.g. using a master-password
protected password manager in order to cope with remembering
different passwords for all accounts. However, some of these coping
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strategies are based on misconceptions about password security,
e.g. a misconception about what exactly makes a password hard
to guess for attackers might lead users to add a ‘!’ to end of the
password to make it secure [18]. This leads to situations, where
users believe that they have secure password practices, when in
reality they do not: the users are simply unaware of their insecure
password practices.
Misconceptions about password security appear frequently in
published literature, e.g. the lack of mental models representing
automated attacks and defenses against them [18]. Knowing the
prevalent misconceptions and addressing them with effective inter-
ventions is vital, when aiming to decrease insecure coping strategies.
Thus, the overall aim of this work is to identify and address the
misconceptions about password security reported in the literature.
To realize this work, we applied the four step process depicted
in Figure 1. First, we conducted a systematic literature review to
identify themisconceptions about password security reported in the
literature (step 1). Therein, we identified 23 differentmisconceptions
about password security. We found that there exist misconceptions
in basically all aspects of password security and that four categories
of misconceptions emerged. Additionally, we found that only some
of the misconceptions always apply, while others depend on the
particular situation the user is confronted with.
Then, we developed interventions to address the misconceptions
identified in our literature review (step 2). The development in-
cluded refinements derived from structured expert feedback. Using
the developed interventions, we then conducted a formal user study
(step 3) to evaluate the interventions’ effectiveness with overall
90 employees in three small and medium-sized enterprises (SME).
We find that our interventions significantly decrease the overall
prevalence of the identified misconceptions. Last but not least, we
propose further refinements for the interventions (step 4), based
on the results of the user study.
Identification of misconceptions about password security
in the literature
Development of interventions addressing the misconceptions, 
including round of expert feedback





Proposal of refined version of the interventions based on evaluation 
findingsStep 4
Figure 1: The process underlying this work.
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The core contributions of this work are:
(a) Providing a list of the misconceptions about password secu-
rity reported in the literature.
(b) Providing formally evaluated interventions which address
the identified misconceptions and decrease their overall
prevalence.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. In the next
section (section 2), we present and discuss the methodology as
well as the results of our literature review. Then, we describe the
development of our interventions (section 3). Thereafter, we present
the methodology as well as the results of our user study and discuss
both (section 4). Lastly, we conclude and point out areas for future
work in section 5.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section we present the methodology and results with respect
to our first contribution, the identification of misconceptions about
password security in the published literature.
2.1 Methodology
We conducted a systematic literature review to identify all the mis-
conceptions regarding password security reported in the literature.
Since the goal of this research is to give an up-to-date overview
of misconceptions about password security, we only considered
publications from the last decade, i.e. published since 2007. Af-
ter consultation with native English speaking experts in the field,
we used as search terms “password” in conjunction with each of
the terms “misconception”, “misunderstanding”, “misperception”,
“flawed perception”, and “flawed understanding”, one after the other.
Both terms (i.e. “password” and any one of the other search terms
respectively) needed to be present in the publication. As sources
for the publications, we relied on (a) the databases Sciencedirect,
ACM, IEEEexplore, SpringerLink, and Scopus, as well as (b) addi-
tional conferences and journals known to publish relevant research
on passwords, but not indexed by the used databases, i.e. Usenix
Security Symposium, Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security,
Usable Security Workshop, Trustworthy Interfaces for Passwords
and Personal Information Workshop, Journal of Computer Security,
International Journal of Information Security and Privacy, Interna-
tional Journal of Technology and Human Interaction, Human IT:
Journal of information technology studies as a human science, MIS
Quarterly, Journal of Information Systems Security. We found 3777
publications meeting the search terms in the sources.
From the 3777 publications meeting the search terms, we nar-
rowed down the body of relevant literature. Publications not ac-
cessible through the authors’ universities’ libraries were excluded.
For publications where the respective authors had published the
same results multiple times (e.g. extended versions of conference
papers in journals), only the latest publication was considered. Also,
non-peer-reviewed publications (white-papers, technical reports,
etc.) were excluded. To filter out the publications not explicitly
dealing with misconceptions in field of passwords, the publications
were manually screened based on title, abstract and if necessary a
glance on the full text. 15 relevant publications reporting on mis-
conceptions met these additional search criteria. To broaden the
results, first a forward, then a backward search was performed,
resulting in overall 20 relevant publications. The full list of relevant
publications identified in our literature research can be found in
section 7.
2.2 Results
Based on these 20 relevant publications, we identified 23 misconcep-
tions about password security. In the following, we describe each of
the identified misconceptions. Note that we list all misconceptions
reported in the literature, even when there is no sharp definition in
the respective publication. Also, some of the misconceptions are
not universal, i.e. they only apply in certain attack scenarios. A
through discussion is beyond the scope of this work, but this aspect
will be briefly discussed in the following where necessary.
2.2.1 The inclusion of numbers makes passwords automatically
more secure. M1 was reported in five publications: [1, 12, 14, 17, 18].
The underlying problem with this misconception is that additional
character classes (i.e. lowercase, uppercase, numbers, symbols) can
make passwords more secure, but this is not automatically the case.
Research has shown that (a) when users try to add additional char-
acter classes to their passwords, they tend to create very predictable
passwords [17] and that (b) forcing users to put these characters
in places where they contribute most to the guessing-resistance
of the passwords decreases the usability of the created passwords
[14]. This misconception can be assumed to be universal, since it
applies to all attack scenarios where passwords are guessed.
2.2.2 The inclusion of symbols makes passwords automatically
more secure. M2 was also reported in five publications: [1, 12, 14,
17, 18]. The underlying problem is the same as for M1: users tend
to put the chosen symbols in predictable places in the password.
Analogously to M1, this misconception should also be assumed to
be universal.
2.2.3 The inclusion of uppercase letters makes passwords auto-
matically more secure. M3 was reported in two publications: [1, 17].
The underlying problem is the same as for M1and M2: users tend
to put the uppercase letters in predictable places in the password
(in particular in the front). Analogously to M1 and M2, this miscon-
ception should also be assumed to be universal.
2.2.4 Common substitutions (e.g. a→ 4) make passwords more
secure. M4 was reported in two publications: [17, 19]. The underly-
ing problem is the same as for M1, M2, and M3: users tend to use
predictable substitutions in efforts to make their passwords more
secure. Analogously to M1, M2, and M3, this misconception should
also be assumed to be universal.
2.2.5 A word from another language than the user’s mother
tongue is a secure password. M5 could be identified in one pub-
lication: [16]. The underlying problem with this misconception is
that attackers can easily build large dictionaries with words from
several languages using e.g. the freely available wikipedia entries
in nearly 300 languages. However, this implies that the attacker
has a large number of guesses available which is usually only the
case in offline attacks. Consequently, this misconception mostly
relevant to offline attack scenarios.
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M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12 M13 M14 M15 M16 M17 M18 M19 M20 M21 M22 M23
Figure 2: Overview of all misconceptions about password security identified in the literature review.
2.2.6 Reusing passwords is OK for secure passwords, but should
be avoided for weak passwords. M6 is one of three misconceptions
concerning the reuse of passwords, which is a common coping
strategy of users [34]. It was reported in one publication: [20]. The
underlying problem with this misconception is that users applying
this misconception in their handling of passwords might end up
with secure passwords at more websites, but at the same time
increase the risk of cross-site attacks [20] (e.g. when a website leaks
passwords in the clear and that password is used by an attacker
to break into an account at another website). In particular, this
misconception does not include the real metric on which a decision
to reuse a password should be based: whether reusing a password
would allow an attacker to compromise additional valuable data
[25, 29]. This misconception applies to all attack scenarios, where
users have accounts at multiple websites. Thus, it can be assumed
to be true for most users today.
2.2.7 Reusing passwords is OK for passwords that are entered
more frequently. M7 could be identified in two publications: [10, 20].
The problem underlying this misconception is the same as with M6:
it does not include the real metric on which a decision to reuse a
password should bemade. Thus, usersmight reuse passwords across
accounts that give access to different valuable data. Analogously to
M6, this misconception applies to all attack scenarios, where users
have accounts on multiple sites.
2.2.8 Reusing passwords is more secure behavior than writing
them down. M8 was identified in one publication [4]. The underly-
ing problem of this misconception is that while users can control
where they store written down passwords (i.e. they can make sure
it is stored securely), they have no way of knowing whether a web
service is among the many not sufficiently protecting the users’
data [22] (i.e. their password might be insecurely stored, without
the users having any way of knowing). Analogously to M6 and M7,
this misconception applies to all attack scenarios, where users have
accounts on multiple sites.
2.2.9 Notes of passwords do not need to be particularly protected.
M9 regards the handling of paper notes as well as electronic notes
[15]. It was reported in three publications: [8, 15, 16]. The problem
underlying this misconception is that notes of passwords can be
beneficial and have been recommended by security experts (e.g.
[33]), but this advice always comes with the condition of secure
storage of that note. Thereby, in particular the unprotected storage
of cleartext passwords in the cloud (e.g. a text document in Drop-
box or in note-taking services such as OneNote) poses a severe
risk. This misconception applies to all attack scenarios, where an
attacker might get access to a note of a password. With respect to
physical notes this includes physical access to the place where it is
stored. When electronic notes are stored in the cloud, the variety of
attack scenarios is much larger and potentially includes e.g. rogue
administrative staff at cloud services or unencrypted transfer of the
password data in the clear to the cloud service.
2.2.10 Passwords have to be changed proactively on a regular
basis. M10 was reported in one publication: [5]. The problem un-
derlying this misconception is that research [24, 38] indicates that
changing passwords on a regular basis does not improve practical
security and instead only puts unnecessary burden on the user. As
a matter of fact, while it was still included in earlier versions, the-
most recent versions of password advice from the US NIST [26] and
the British NCSC [29] both discourage using mandatory password
changes, unless a user account has actually been compromised.
This bares potential for confusion among users, since not all stan-
dardizing bodies have adapted their standards with respect to these
findings (e.g. PCI-DSS [31]). With respect to the relevant attack sce-
narios, this misconception is universal, since it potentially applies
to all of the user’s passwords.
2.2.11 Storing passwords in the browser does not mean one is
using a password manager. M11 indicates that users mistake tech-
nologies that are essentially the same as different. It was reported
in one publication: [18]. The underlying problem of this miscon-
ception is that users on the one hand argue that using dedicated
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password managers is insecure, but on the other hand store their
passwords in browsers. It is important that users understand that
the same security requirements (e.g. setting a master-password in
most situations) apply to dedicated password managers and those
integrated in browsers. This misconception is relevant in all attack
scenarios, where an attacker could access the passwords which are
stored in the browser (e.g. physical access to the device or storage
disk).
2.2.12 Keyboard patterns are secure passwords. M12 was re-
ported in one publication: [17]. The problem underlying M12 is that
while patterns on the keyboard might seem like random passwords,
the security issues associated with using them for passwords are
well documented [17, 36]. This misconception applies to all attack
scenarios where guessing attacks are viable and therefore should
be considered to be universal.
2.2.13 Using dates of birth that are not the user’s makes pass-
words more secure. M13 was reported in one publication: [18]. The
security issues associated with using dates as passwords are well
documented [37]. Analogously to M12, this misconception is rele-
vant in all attack scenarios where guessing attacks are viable and
can thus be assumed to be universal.
2.2.14 Attackers do not automate their attacks on passwords,
but perform them by hand. M14 was reported in five publications:
[3, 6, 9, 10, 18]. The underlying problem of this misconception
is that users underestimate the scale of attacks that specialized
tools allow. This misconception is relevant in all attack scenarios
were automation is possible (e.g. phishing attacks [30]). Thus, it is
not relevant in attack scenarios that are difficult to automate (e.g.
attacks requiring physical access to the users’ device).
2.2.15 All attackers are strangers which are (geographically) far
away. M15 was found in three publications [3, 6, 17]. The problem
underlying this misconception is that it limits the perception of
possible attacks. However, there are many motives for an attack
on a user’s passwords or accounts, but not all of them relate to an
unknown hacker which is geographically far away, e.g. someone
impersonating cleaning personnel or help desk staff to get access
to an office, co-workers who want that changes cannot be traced
back to them, or a nosy acquaintance who wants to spy on the
communication with other users. This misconception is universal,
since it applies to potentially all passwords of a user.
2.2.16 All attackers are people the users know. M16 represents
the opposite assumption of M15. It was reported in two publications:
[3, 12]. The underlying problem of this misconception is the same
as for M15: a disregard of likely attacks (e.g. trawling attacks, where
attackers target as many accounts and the goal is not to get into
one specific account, but in as many accounts as possible [21]).
Analogously to M15, this misconception is universal.
2.2.17 Email is security-wise not an important service and there-
fore does not require a secure password. M17 was reported in two
publications: [3, 18]. The underlying problem of this misconcep-
tion is that insufficiently protected email accounts can compromise
other accounts if passwords can be reset using links sent by mail.
Thus, a compromise of the user’s email account can cause a snow-
ball effect of further compromises. Additionally, attackers can use
compromised accounts to send out spam in the user’s name. This
misconception is relevant for all email accounts that are used by
the user to communicate with others or that can be used to reset
the passwords of other accounts.
2.2.18 A SIM-PIN is sufficient to protect the data on a smartphone
from unauthorized access. M18 was identified in one publication:
[11]. Its underlying problem is that only a system PIN used to lock
a device protects the data on the respective device. A SIM-PIN can
be easily circumvented by removing the SIM from the device. This
misconception applies to all attack scenarios, where the user has
cellular devices allowing removal of the SIM card.
2.2.19 It is not necessary to set a password to lock the screen of
unattended devices. M19 was reported in two publications: [4, 9].
The underlying problem is that attacks aiming at physical access to
the user’s devices are neglected (e.g. impersonation of help desk staff
or cleaning personnel). Analogously to M9, this misconception is
relevant in all attack scenarios, where an attacker can gain physical
access to a user’s devices.
2.2.20 Work accounts have lower security requirements because
the IT staff is responsible for security. M20 was identified in one
publication: [15]. The problem underlying this misconception is
that users might perceive their work account differently than their
private accounts, while it is exposed to at least the same degree
of threats. This misconception is relevant in all attack scenarios,
where users have both, private and work accounts.
2.2.21 The frequency of use of an account influences its secu-
rity requirements. M21 was reported in one publication: [15]. The
underlying problem is that it disregards the aspects that actually
influence the security requirements of an account (i.e. data acces-
sible in the account and actions which can be performed with the
account). This misconception should be assumed to be universal,
since it potentially affects all accounts of a user.
2.2.22 Bank accounts do not need to be protected with strong
passwords if there is no money in them. M22 was identified in one
publication: [18]. The problem underlying this misconception is
that while some research reports that financial sites are of high
value to users (e.g. [15]), in others users voiced that if there was no
money in their account, the security requirements would be low.
Whether this misconception applies to a user depends on factors
such as whether the account can be overdrawn and being left with
debts (and the incurring interest) might be a concern. In contrast,
if the account cannot be overdrawn, there is no money in it, and
the attacker does not have any possibility to transfer any money
from other accounts of the user to that particular account and then
withdraw it, the security requirement might indeed be low.
2.2.23 It is possible to be too unimportant to be targeted and
thus to have to choose secure passwords. M23 was reported in three
publications: [6, 13, 17]. The underlying problem of this miscon-
ception is that not being aware of attacks as well as corresponding
counter-measures renders users even more vulnerable to attacks.
This misconception is universal with respect to the relevant attack
scenarios, since it potentially affects all passwords of the user.
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Figure 3: Example of the design of the interventions after the expert evaluation.
2.2.24 Further Findings. During our literature review, we en-
countered two further misconceptions, which will not be regarded
in the remainder of this work. The first one states that security
updates are not important (reported in [5]). It does not pertain to
password security directly, but revolves around one advice deemed
most important by security experts [5]: installing security updates.
The second one concerns password managers. While using pass-
word managers is generally considered to be good advice [5, 16],
there also exists a mistrust towards them (reported in [2, 5, 7]). Such
a lack of trust is difficult to address with explanatory texts. One
might try to convince users by explaining to users that experts in
the field trust password managers (as e.g. found in [16]). Yet, trust is
not easily established by textual communication [23, 32]. Therefore,
this lack of trust should not be treated as an issue which can be
addressed by knowledge transfer and will not be regarded in the
remainder of this work. However, following up on this issue might
be an interesting field for future investigations.
2.3 Discussion
Overall, we identified 23 misconceptions in the published litera-
ture. These span a wide variety of aspects, from the inclusion of
different character classes to the security trade-offs between reuse
and writing passwords down. Thereby, four broader categories of
misconceptions emerged: composition, handling, attacks, and mis-
cellaneous. Figure 2 depicts all the misconceptions we identified
along those five categories.
Composition: This category comprises all misconceptions regard-
ing the password composition, such as inclusion of different char-
acter classes (i.e. letters, numbers, and symbols) by the user.
Handling: This category includes all misconceptions with respect
to behaviour associated with the handling of passwords, such as
reuse of passwords for multiple accounts.
Attacks: This category contains all the misconceptions concern-
ing the attackers and their strategies, that do not directly relate to
password composition or the handling of passwords.
Miscellaneous: This category consists of further, more general,
misconceptions, which were found in the literature to also apply to
password security as well.
Note that certain limitations apply to our work, as is the case
with every systematic literature review. We explicitly excluded non-
peer-reviewed publications and those published before 2007. This
might have limited our results and led to the exclusion of relevant
work. However, we argue that in both cases the exclusion generally
increases the quality and relevancy of the literature included in our
systematic literature review: non-peer-reviewed publications might
introduce low quality results and too old publications might lead to
the inclusion of misconceptions which are not relevant anymore.
Lastly, a broader selection of search terms might have resulted in
more relevant research. Yet, we argue that our process of screening
literature and feedback from native English speaking experts in the
field, represents the most systematic way to choose appropriate
search terms for the literature review.
3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERVENTIONS
To address the misconceptions we identified in our systematic lit-
erature review, we developed interventions for each of them. We
decided to develop a text based intervention, since this allows sup-
porting multiple training formats (e.g. instructor-based, computer-
based or text-based as proposed in [35]).
As a first version of the interventions, we created short texts for
each of the misconceptions, which explained the misconception
itself, the scenarios it is relevant in, and the respective underlying
problem (e.g. the underlying problem with M1 is that numbers only
improve the guessing resistance of a password, if they are put in an
unpredictable place in the password). The wording and contents
of this first version of the interventions were iteratively improved
using informal feedback from information security and psychology
experts as well as lay users. During this iterative design, it became
clear that in three instances the interventions of multiple miscon-
ceptions converged to very similar texts and only differed slightly
in the wording. On multiple occasions throughout the development,
we received feedback that these misconceptions might be better
addressed together. Therefore, we integrated the texts of multiple
misconceptions into one in these three instances: (1) M1, M2, M3,
and M4, (2) M6 and M7, and (3) M15 and M16.
To improve this first version, we held a round of structured expert
feedback with the goal of collecting additional opinions regarding
the interventions’ texts and expert assessments of whether the
identified misconceptions had been overall sufficiently addressed
from an information security point of view. For this purpose, we
created a PDF-file with all interventions and a free text field for
each intervention, in which the experts could enter their feedback.
We contacted 30 independent information security experts from
academia and from the industry (i.e. researchers, information secu-
rity consultants, auditors, and administrative staff) and sent them
the interventions with instructions to give feedback for each indi-
vidual intervention. From the 30 experts we sent invitations to, 13
sent us their feedback. We received responses from three scientists,
four IT security consultants, three IT administrators, two people
working in the IT security department of their companies, and one
person working in a company developing security solutions. Thus,
we received feedback from a diverse set of experts.
The expert feedback round lead to several refinements of the
interventions, such as additional explanations in the texts, e.g. con-
cerning M19 the experts suggested adding more concrete informa-
tion about possible attackers: “The following types of people should be
included as potentially interested in the users data: Cleaning personnel,
nosy co-workers, or future ex-co-workers.” (Expert 7) or “Explana-
tions with respect to who might try to access the devices should be
added [for example], cleaning personnel [or] nosy colleagues.” (Expert
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Table 1: The wording of the intervention texts after the round of expert feedback. Note that the wording represents a transla-
tion into English from the German original versions created for the study. Creating German texts was necessary to allow the
study presented in Section 4.
ID Wording of the Intervention after Expert Feedback
M1 Using specialized software, attackers try to mimick human behaviour when guessing passwords. Thereby, they use a long list of
words (from dictionaries, but also passwords from past breaches) and apply different common modifications to these words to
generate additional words they will also use as guesses for the password:
• Appending or prepending numbers and symbols (e.g. adding an “!” to the end is a popular choice)
• Substituting letters with numbers (e.g. E→ 3) or with symbols (e.g. a →@)
• Substituting lowercase letters with uppercase letters (in particular at the beginning of words)




M5 While it might seem that using a word from a language that is not your mother tongue as password is secure, this can be very
problematic. In particular when attackers can make a large number of guesses for each account (e.g. there is no limit on the login
attempts at a web service), they will use words from many languages to try and guess your password.
M6 Unfortunately, it happens time and again that even large web services handle the passwords of their users carelessly which then
leak to attackers. Therefore, even passwords which are very hard to guess should not be reused. If a password is leaked by a
service in the clear, it does not matter how hard it is to guess. This also holds for passwords you enter frequently. Do not reuse
them. The more often you reuse a password at different services, the bigger is the chance of it getting into the hands of an attacker.
M7
M8 If you store a written down password in a safe and secure location, making such notes can actually be beneficial (e.g. after changing
a password until you have memorized it). However, if you do not need a note of a password anymore, you should dispose it (e.g.
burn it). If you keep your written down passwords securely stored, having such notes is more secure than reusing passwords:
Guessing a unique password is more difficult to guess than a password that might have leaked from another service which was
affected by a leak, even if that password is a variation of a different password.
M9 Written down passwords must always be stored in a secure location (i.e. a location that can only be accessed by yourself). If you
use a password manager you should in most cases set a strong master password. Only in cases where all of the four criteria below
are met, it is not mandatory to set a password:
• You are the only user of your devices
• The hard drive of your device is encrypted
• You do not synchronize your passwords across your devices
• You always lock your devices, when you are not using them
M10 Scientists have found that changing passwords you need to remember proactively (i.e. without occurrence of an incident) is
unhelpful in protecting your accounts. The additional effort required of the users is unproportionally larger than the achieved
security benefits. Even governmental bodies, such as the US NIST or the British NCSC are already adapting their recommendations.
They recommend to change passwords only when the old one has fallen into the hands of an attacker instead of changing it
proactively. These governmental bodies believe that the web services have to implement a rigorous monitoring of their own
systems and that they should use so-called lock-out mechanisms (e.g. limiting the number of possible login attempts). Changing
passwords that have to be remembered is therefore obsolete advice which should not be followed anymore.
M11 Internet browsers often have an integrated password manager, which allows saving passwords entered on websites. Saving
passwords in a browser is the same as saving them in a dedicated password manager. If the hard drive of your device is not
encrypted and your passwords are saved in a password manager, which is not protected by a master password (no matter if in a
browser or as dedicated program), attackers can easily copy your passwords off your hard drive, if they have physical access to it
or your device is infected with malware.
M12 Using walks or patterns on your keyboard as password (e.g. “1q2w3e4r”) is no good practice to generate secure passwords. As a
matter of fact, such patterns will be present in the dictionary of every attacker trying to guess passwords. Therefore, you should
never use keyboard patterns as passwords, even if they contain uppercase letters, numbers, and symbols.
M13 Attackers can easily use specialized software to guess all combinations of days, months, and years. Therefore, using your dog’s
birthday or the birthday of your favorite actor instead of your own will not render your password harder to guess for a professional
attacker. This holds in all situations, where attackers can make large numbers of guesses (e.g. when a web service does not limit
the number of possible login attempts, before the account is locked).
M14 Attackers can easily automate their attacks using readily available specialized software. Using such software, attackers can easily
e.g. test many different passwords or snoop on unencrypted network traffic.
M15 Some people think that only cyber-criminals from the other side of the planet will typically attack them. Others believe that only
those close to them will try to get access to their devices. However, attackers can come from both of these groups (and anywhere
in between), e.g. a criminal hacker trying to access your bank account, a person posing as a co-worker, a co-worker trying to hide
illegitimate access to sensitive information and framing others, a jealous friend who wants to check your communication with
others, or a criminal employee of a cloud service who uses his position and access to user data to gain illegitimate profit.
M16
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
ID Wording of the Intervention after Expert Feedback
M17 Even if you use your email account only to send messages to others, it is still a valuable target for attackers. Exploiting the
possibility to reset passwords of other accounts is particularly relevant. Your email account holds email from all the services you
use. Therefore, attackers can easily look up all the web services you use and reset their passwords to access them.
M18 The SIM-PIN is the PIN you have to enter to unlock the telephony functions of your mobile phone. This PIN is not sufficient to
protect the data which is stored on a smartphone. An attacker with physical access to the phone can easily remove the SIM from
the phone to bypass this check. Moreover, many phones simply allow bypassing the entry of the SIM-PIN, resulting in a phone
that is not able to make calls, but is unlocked to access all data on it.
M19 You should set a password lock and use it whenever you leave a device unattended – even if a co-worker or friend is in the vicinity
(e.g. same office). If during your absence these people leave too (e.g. are called away, make telephone calls, or go to the toilet)
your device is completely unprotected. However, even when your co-workers remain in the vicinity of the device, an attacker
disguising himself as cleaning personnel or a support technician might be able to access a device unnoticed.
M20 You are responsible for the security of your devices, even at work when there is a dedicated IT department. The staff of the IT
department can help you, but in the end it is your job to keep the device secure. Most attacks on organizations target the employees
first, in order to get access to internal systems.
M21 The value of your accounts is not influenced by how regularly you use it. Instead, the only determining factors are the data which
can be accessed in the account and which actions can be performed in the account.
M22 Money is not the only valuable associated with your bank account. When accessing your online banking account, attackers can
easily see where you are shopping, when you book your holidays and where you are paying abroad, your address, your phone
number . . . All they need is your password, no TANs are needed. (Note for readers: TANs are transaction numbers. All German
banks require these to authorize transactions. Since all participants in our study were German, all knew this term and its semantics in
the context of online banking.)
M23 Some people believe that they are not important enough to even be targeted by attackers. This is a misjudgment which can have
potentially severe consequences. Many attacks on the Internet (e.g. guessing passwords of users at a web service or sending
phishing emails) can be easily automated and are then performed in an untargeted fashion. The attacker does not care who’s
account they can access, they just try to get access to as many accounts as possible. Especially getting access to your devices is
always interesting for an attacker. Attackers have many uses for your devices, even if you believe there is no valuable data on
them. They can encrypt all your files and demand a ransom to decrypt them again, they can install programs which run in the
background that can be used to attack other users, or they can even make your device act as a server on the Internet to host a
phishing or scamming website tricking other users.
2). The wording of all intervention texts after the expert feedback
round can be found in Table 1.
Additionally, there was consistent feedback from the experts
on the presentation of the misconceptions, i.e. that they should be
visually separated to allow recognizing the texts as misconceptions
even when integrated in longer texts on password security (e.g. “I
would recommend to introduce visual elements (e.g. boxes) to make the
misconceptions stand out.” (Expert 10)). We adapted the presentation
of all misconceptions accordingly by adding a dedicated memorable
icon and a colored box. This design was iterated using informal
feedback from lay users. The final design is illustrated in Figure 3.
4 USER STUDY
The wording of the intervention texts after the expert feedback
round was then evaluated with lay users in a user study. The goal of
this user study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention
texts in eliminating the identified misconceptions. The respective
hypotheses for our research are:
HO : The intervention significantly decreases the overall preva-
lence of the identified misconceptions.
HMx : The intervention for misconception Mx significantly de-
creases the prevalence of Mx .
Thereby, HO represents the overall hypothesis with additional hy-
potheses HMx for each of the misconceptions.
4.1 Methodology
The evaluation consisted of three phases: (a) a pre-treatment ques-
tionnaire measuring the prevalence of the different misconceptions
in our participant sample, (b) the treatment using the version of the
interventions after the expert feedback round alongside informa-
tion describing attacks on passwords and user accounts as well as
respective defences, and (c) a post-treatment questionnaire measur-
ing the prevalence of the different misconceptions in our participant
sample after having been exposed to the interventions as well as
collecting basic demographics data. Consequentially, the user study
employs a within-subject design. Every participant saw all inter-
ventions. The study methodology conforms to all requirements of
our university’s ethics commission.
Both, the pre-treatment and post-treatment questionnaires used
the same statements as study items (see Table 2 in the appendix). For
each of those items, the participant had to state whether they believe
the statement was correct or incorrect. The order of the items was
randomized for each participant for both, the pre-treatment and
the post-treatment questionnaires. Note that 9 out of the 24 items
are formulated as the inverse of the respective misconception, in
order to give the participants both correct and incorrect statements
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Figure 4: The correct and incorrect responses for each of the misconceptions before reading through the intervention texts.
The misconceptions affected by ceiling effects are marked with a ‘^’.
to respond to. The items were developed in an iterative process
using feedback from independent experts and from two rounds of
pre-tests with lay users.
We decided to follow the recommendation by Haeussinger and
Kranz [27] to evaluate materials for employees in real work en-
vironments employing experimental research designs. Therefore,
the evaluation was conducted with employees at three small and
medium-sized enterprises (SME). We conducted the user study
in German SMEs and therefore both, the interventions and the
questionnaires, were given to the participants in German. The
participants were explicitly selected as lay users with respect to
information security and from a wide range of professions by a
contact person in each of the three organizations. The recruitment
in the organizations was done completely by the contact persons,
who were given the instruction to select only lay people from their
organization. The contact person also sent out and collected the
PDF-files. Using a contact person as intermediary in each organiza-
tion ensured that participants remained anonymous while being
able to deliver the study materials to them via email in their real
work environments. Participants received the questionnaires and
the interventions as PDF-files one after the other as per the three
phases outlined before (i.e. one PDF-file per phase). Only upon
sending back the completed pre-treatment questionnaire to the
contect person, the participant received the interventions with the
instruction to take their time to read them. Once the participants
confirmed that they had read the interventions, they received the
post-treatment questionnaire. Once all participants in an organiza-
tion had completed the post-treatment questionnaire, the contact
person sent the filled out questionnaires to the authors.
4.2 Results
In this section, we present the results of our user study: first the
demographics of the participants, then the results concerning the
prevalence of the misconceptions identified in our literature review.
4.2.1 Participants. Overall 90 employees from three SMEs in
Germany were recruited for our user study. Unfortunately, 6 partic-
ipants had to be excluded from the analysis. 56 participants were
male, 27 were female, one participant did not fill this question. The
participants’ age ranged from 19 years to 43 years (M: 30.0 years;
SD: 5.4 years).
4.2.2 Analysis of the overall hypothesis. As becomes apparent
from Figure 4, most of the misconceptions were prevalent in our
sample of SME employees during the first phase of the study (i.e.
before the treatment). Some of the misconceptions appeared in the
majority of the participants. In particular, misconceptions M1, M2,
M3, M4, M10, and M11 show low portions of correct responses
and seem to be especially prevalent in our sample before the inter-
vention. In contrast, some misconceptions are not prevalent in our
sample. They can be identified by ceiling effects. A ceiling effect
appears when the number of correct responses in the pre-treatment
questionnaire is already so high that a significant increase of correct
responses cannot occur, i.e. even if all incorrect responses in the
pre-treatment questionnaire would be affected by the treatment and
resulted in correct responses in the post-treatment questionnaire,
this would not result in a significant difference. Such ceiling effects
appear for the misconceptions M5, M9, M13, M15, M16, M19, and
M20.
After the intervention, the overall portion of correct responses
increases from 72.8% in the pre-treatment questionnaires to 90.2%
in the post-treatment questionnaires. A Wilcoxon signed rank test
with continuity correction shows a significantly higher number of
correct responses per participant in the post-treatment question-
naire than in the pre-treatment questionnaire of the evaluation
(V = 58, p < .001).
4.2.3 Analysis of individual misconceptions. Figure 5 shows for
each misconception the individual differences in correct and incor-
rect responses between the pre-treatment questionnaire and the
post-treatment questionnaire. We tested the individual differences
with McNemar’s test using Bonferroni-Holm corrected α-levels.
On the one hand, all of the misconceptions which stood out
with high numbers of incorrect responses before the treatment
show a significant improvement: M1 (χ2(1) = 41.02, p < .001),
M2 (χ2(1) = 28.27, p < .001), M3 (χ2(1) = 38.03, p < .001), M4
(χ2(1) = 39.02, p < .001), M10 (χ2(1) = 40.42, p < .001), and M11
(χ2(1) = 15.72,p < .001). Yet, it is of note that despite showing a sig-
nificant improvement, M2 still exhibits 48.9% incorrect answers in
the post-treatment questionnaire. The misconceptions with higher
numbers of correct pre-treatment responses showing significant
improvements after the treatment are M6 (χ2(1) = 15.43, p < .001),
M8 (χ2(1) = 10.03, p = .002), M18 (χ2(1) = 11.08, p < .001), and
M23 (χ2(1) = 9.09, p = .003).
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Figure 5: The correct and incorrect responses for each of the misconceptions before and after reading through the interven-
tion. Each color represents the respective number of participants with “pre-treatment/post-treatment” responses, e.g. “pre-
incorrect/post-correct” is the number of participants having responded incorrectly in the pre-treatment questionnaire and
correctly in the post-treatment questionnaire. The misconceptions with significant improvements are marked with a ‘*’. The
misconceptions affected by ceiling effects are marked with a ‘^’.
On the other hand, despite the decrease of the overall prevalence
of misconceptions, the number of correct responses did not increase
for all misconceptions from the pre-treatment questionnaire to the
post-treatment questionnaire. Namely, the two misconceptions M9
and M19 exhibit more incorrect answers in the post-treatment
questionnaire than in the pre-treatment questionnaire. However,
for both the difference between pre-treatment questionnaire and
post-treatment questionnaire we did not find significant differences.
For the remaining misconceptions where our analysis showed
no significant difference in the correct answers between the pre-
treatment questionnaire and the post-treatment questionnaire (i.e.
M7, M12, M14, M17, M20, M21, and M22), there does not seem to be
one unique reason. We will discuss possible reasons in section 4.3.
4.3 Discussion and Final Refinements
In this section, we discuss the findings of our user study and de-
rive from them the proposals for refinements to the interventions
where appropriate. Note that the empirical validation of these re-
finements is still furture work. We first discuss the overall findings
and then discuss the results for the individual misconceptions one
after the other in distinct subsections. Last but not least, we discuss
limitations of this user study.
4.3.1 Overall findings. The prevalence of the different miscon-
ceptions varies greatly. Despite being reported in the literature
review, several misconceptions did not seem to be prevalent in our
sample, as evidenced by the ceiling effects found for M5, M13, M15,
and M16. Still, our interventions led to a significant decrease in
the overall prevalence of the identified misconceptions, since most
of the other misconceptions could be addressed by our developed
interventions.
Most of the misconceptions not affected by the ceiling effects
could be addressed by the intervention we created leading to sig-
nificant increases in the portions of correct responses between
the pre-treatment questionnaires and the post-treatment question-
naires (10 out of 16). However, the results with respect to several
misconceptions warrant a closer inspection. On the one hand, the
intervention texts for the six misconceptions M7, M12, M14, M17,
M21, and M22 did not result in a significant improvement with
respect to the prevalence of the respective misconception. On the
other hand, despite exhibiting more than 90% of correct responses
in the post-treatment questionnaire, the two misconceptions M9
and M19 misled more participants to an incorrect answer after the
treatment, than they resulted in additional correct answers. Also,
the elevated number of incorrect responses after the intervention
with respect to misconception M2 warrant closer inspection. In the
following, we discuss each of the aforementioned ten misconcep-
tions individually in ascending order (i.e. M2, M7, M12, . . . ).
4.3.2 M2: The inclusion of symbols makes passwords automat-
ically more secure. While M2 exhibits a significant improvement
from the pre-treatment questionnaire to the post-treatment ques-
tionnaire, it reaches only 51.1% of correct responses. This is the
lowest value among all misconceptions. Consequently, we argue
that further refinements are required. We propose to add more
concrete examples to the intervention texts, based on the studies
reporting this misconception and common mangling rules used
with password cracking software1:
Using specialized software, attackers try to mimick human be-
haviour when guessing passwords. They use a long list of words (from
dictionaries, but also passwords from past breaches) and apply differ-
ent common modifications to these words to generate additional words
they will also use as guesses for the password. Such modifications are:
• Appending or prepending numbers and symbols (e.g. adding an
“!” to the end is a popular choice). Examples of passwords that
can be guessed very quickly using such rules are “brooklyn16”,
“bubblegum1!”, “1proudmom” or “Mamamia!!!”.
• Substituting letters with numbers (e.g. E → 3) or with sym-
bols (e.g. a→ @). Examples of passwords that can be guessed
very quickly using such rules are “p@ssw0rd”, “L0vemetal”,
“m0nkeyl10n”, or “4n4belle”.
• Substituting lowercase letters with uppercase letters (in partic-
ular at the beginning of words). Examples of passwords that
can be guessed very quickly using such rules are “pAsswOrd”,
“Thisismypass”, “NOTSOSURE”, “daywalker”, or “Lovemetal”.
Therefore, using numbers, symbols, or uppercase letters in your pass-
word will not automatically make it harder to guess.
1Based on the winning contribution to the Best64 Challenge, aiming to find the most
effective rules: https://hashcat.net/forum/thread-1002.html
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4.3.3 M7: Reusing passwords is OK for passwords that are en-
tered more frequently. M7 is part of one instance, where multiple
interventions were combined into one during the iterative design
(see Section 3). While a McNemar test did not show a significant
improvement for M7, it did for the misconception addressed in
the same intervention text (M6). Consequently, one might assume
that the formulations addressing M6 might dominate M7. When
inspecting the intervention text closely, it must be acknowledged
that it is somewhat unbalanced, giving more room toM6 than to M7.
Therefore, we propose the following more balanced formulation of
the intervention:
Unfortunately, it happens time and again that even large web
services handle the passwords of their users carelessly which then
leak to attackers. Therefore, even passwords which are very hard to
guess should not be reused. If a password is leaked by a service in the
clear, it does not matter how hard it is hard to guess. How frequent
you enter the password for a specific account does also not affect
the security requirements of that account and warrant reuse of that
password. Reusing passwords should always be avoided. The more
often you reuse a password at different services, the bigger the chance
of it getting into the hands of an attacker.
The other instances where the interventions of multiple miscon-
ceptions were combined into one did not seem to be affected by the
same issue. In one instance (M1, M2, M3, M4) all misconceptions
show a significant improvement after the treatment, in the other
instance (M15, M16) no significant differences could be found (due
to ceiling effects). Thus, the issue does not seem to be a general
issue stemming from combining multiple interventions into one.
4.3.4 M9: Notes of passwords do not need to be particularly pro-
tected. M9 misled seven participants (i.e. seven participants having
answered correctly in the pre-treatment questionnaire answered
incorrectly in the post-treatment questionnaire). However, all five
participants who answered incorrectly in the pre-treatment ques-
tionnaire, changed their answer to the correct one in the post-
treatment questionnaire and the portion of correct post-treatment
responses was 92.1%. Furthermore, the decrease in correct answers
between the pre-treatment questionnaire and the post-treatment
questionnaire was not found to be a significant difference. Thus,
we argue that more testing of the intervention is required, before
any further changes can be proposed.
4.3.5 M12: Keyboard patterns are secure passwords. Our analy-
sis did not show a significant increase in correct answers for M12.
Additionally, it exhibits the largest number of misled participants
of all misconceptions (i.e. 10 participants), although the number
of participants having answered incorrectly in the pre-treatment
questionnaire and correctly in the post-treatment questionnaire
is still larger (i.e. 16 participants). We believe this to be a surpris-
ing finding. The intervention text includes an explanation of the
misconception and how an attacker can use it against the partici-
pants. To increase the clarity of this misconceptions formulation,
we propose the following rephrased version:
Usingwalks or patterns on your keyboard as password (e.g. “1q2w3e4r”
or “mnbvcx”) is no good practice to generate secure passwords. As a
matter of fact, such patterns will be among the first guesses of every
attacker trying to guess passwords. Therefore, you should never use
keyboard patterns as passwords, even if they conform to the password
policy of a website or system and contain uppercase letters, numbers,
and symbols.
4.3.6 M14: Attackers do not automate their attacks on passwords,
but perform them by hand. Our analysis did not show a signifi-
cant increase in correct answers for M14 as well. Due to the fact
that this misconception applies to many possible attacks on pass-
words and user accounts, the intervention was formulated in an
abstract manner with just two concrete examples. In order to make
the underlying problems more tangible for lay users, we propose
the following refinement with an additional example and a more
concrete wording:
Attackers can easily automate their attacks and do not have to
perform attacks manually by hand. Specialized software to e.g. test
billions of different passwords in just one second after a successful
break-in, build phishing websites that look just like the original, or
snoop on passwords in unencrypted network traffic are readily avail-
able.
4.3.7 M17: Email is security-wise not an important service and
therefore does not require a secure password. While helping 15 ad-
ditional participants to understand M17, the respective interven-
tion text did not result in a significant improvement in the post-
treatment questionnaire. The text only covered one possible con-
sequence, i.e. that attackers gain access to additional accounts by
resetting the respective passwords, when they can be reset through
emails (either by sending a reset link or by sending a new password).
Thus, we propose the following refinement by including an addi-
tional consequence, i.e. sending malicious mails to acquaintances:
Even if you use your email account only to send messages to others,
it is still a valuable target for attackers. On the one hand, exploiting
the possibility to reset passwords of other accounts is particularly
relevant. Your email account holds email from all the services you use.
Therefore, attackers can easily look up all the web services you use
and reset their passwords to access them. On the other hand, attackers
can use your email account and the emails within it to determine
your acquaintances and send emails with phishing links or attached
malware to them in your name.
4.3.8 M19: It is not necessary to set a password to lock the screen
of unattended devices. The results with respect to M19 were very
surprising: before the treatment all responses were correct, but after
the treatment some participants changed to incorrect responses.
This indicates that there might be an issue with the intervention.
However, since the decrease in correct responses was not found to
be a significant difference and the portion of correct post-treatment
responses was 94.4%, we argue that further investigations are re-
quired before further refinements to the intervention text can be
proposed.
4.3.9 M21: The frequency of use of an account influences its se-
curity requirements. With respect to M21, no participants changed
from their correct response in the pre-treatment questionnaire to an
incorrect response in the post-treatment questionnaire. Yet, despite
only two participants responding incorrectly after the treatment,
our analysis shows no significant difference after reading the inter-
ventions. In addition, there is also no ceiling effect. The important
aspect with this misconception is that users understand what ex-
actly influences the security requirements of an account and what
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does not. Therefore, we propose to substantiate the explanation
with examples:
The value of your accounts is not influenced by how regularly you
use it. Instead, the only determining factors are the data which can
be accessed in the account (e.g. personal photos) and which actions
can be performed in the account (e.g. sending messages to friends who
trust you would never send them a malicious link).
4.3.10 M22: Bank accounts do not need to be protected with
strong passwords if there is no money in them. Last but not least,
M22 did not show a significant improvement in correct responses
between the pre-treatment questionnaire and the post-treatment
questionnaire. Yet, despite only one incorrect response remaining
in the post-treatment questionnaire, there also was no ceiling effect.
The underlying problem of this misconception is that attackers
can perform different actions than withdrawing money from the
account. Thus, we argue that additional examples might improve
the intervention:
Money is not the only valuable associated with your bank account.
When accessing your online banking account, attackers can easily see
where you are shopping, when you book your holidays and where you
are paying abroad, your address, your phone number . . . All they need
is your password, no TANs are needed. Depending on your bank they
might also change your overdraft limit, open additional accounts, or
order additional banking cards.
4.3.11 Limitations. One limitation of our user study lies in the
participant sample. All participants are lay users employed in Ger-
man SMEs. Thus, it is unclear whether our findings fully translate
to different groups of users. As future work, we plan to repeat the
study in various contexts in order to verify the results there.
Also, due to the fact that the study was conducted following
the recommendation of Haeussinger and Kranz [27] in the real
work environment of the participating employees in three SMEs,
the study setting could not be controlled. The participants were
unsupervised throughout all three stages of the study, i.e. filling
the pre-treatment questionnaire, reading through the interventions,
and filling the post-treatment questionnaire. Thus, a number of
limitations arise: (a) participants might have used the interventions
while filling out the questionnaire, (b) participants might have filled
out the post-treatment questionnaire after reading the interventions
only partially, and (c) participants who work in the same SMEmight
have worked (partially) together.
Additionally, the participants filled the post-treatment question-
naire directly after having read the interventions. Therefore, we
have no data on the effectiveness after longer periods of time have
passed. Further retention studies would be required to verify our
results in this respect.
Last but not least, while the interventions significantly improved
the prevalence of misconceptions in our study and the study was
conducted in the employees’ real work environment, it might be
that the participation in the study has motivated the employees
more than they would have been otherwise. In particular, the ef-
fectiveness outside the study setting and whether the decreased
prevalence of misconceptions leads to more secure behaviour might
depend on how the interventions are presented to the users and
what information is provided alongside them.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we lay the foundation to fight back against a decade
of misconceptions about password security. We provide a list of the
misconceptions about password security reported in the literature
of the past decade. Thereby, we contribute to an increased aware-
ness of these misconceptions among information security experts.
Additionally, we provide formally evaluated interventions which
address the identified misconceptions. The results of our user study
show that the interventions can decrease the prevalence of many
of the identified misconceptions significantly. However, we also
find that some misconceptions are barely present in our sample as
evidenced by the ceiling effects found in our analysis.
Future work includes the validation of our findings with larger
participant samples. Thereby, it might be also of interest to compare
the findings gathered in the organizational context with participants
from the private context. Additionally, investigating the misconcep-
tions reported in the literature before 2007 might provide insights
how the mental models of text passwords have evolved over time
and might prove to be an interesting line of future work.
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APPENDIX
Table 2: The items for each of themisconceptions, translated
from the German originals used in the study.
ID Item of the Intervention
M1 Adding numbers makes passwords automatically more
difficult to guess.
M2 Adding symbols makes passwords automatically more
difficult to guess.
M3 Adding uppercase letters makes passwords automatically
more difficult to guess.
M4 Replacing lowercase letters in the password with num-
bers, symbols, or uppercase letters makes the password
more difficult to guess.
M5 Aword from another language than the your ownmother
tongue is a secure password.
M6 Reusing passwords is OK for secure passwords, but
should be avoided for weak passwords.
M7 It is OK to reuse passwords from user accounts that you
log in frequently for different user accounts.
M8 Security-wise, it is better to write passwords down and
keep them in a secure location than to reuse passwords
for different user accounts.
M9 Notes of passwords must always be stored in a secure
location.
M10 Passwords should be changed frequently.
M11 Storing passwords in the browser is the same as storing
passwords in a password manager.
M12 Walks or patterns on the keyboard (e.g., 1qay2wsx) rep-
resent insecure passwords.
M13 Using dates of birth that are not your own is a good way
to choose secure passwords.
M14 Attacks on user accounts can be automated.
M15 All attackers are strangers from the other end of the
world.
M16 All attackers are only people you know.
M17 Email accounts have particularly high security require-
ments.
M18 A SIM PIN is sufficient to protect data on a smartphone.
M19 It is necessary to lock your devices (PC, laptop, smart-
phone, etc.), even if you leave them unattended only for
a short time.
M20 User accounts in an organization have lower security
requirements than private user accounts, because the IT
department watches over them.
M21 The security requirements of a user account depend on
how often it is used.
M22 Only bank accounts with high account balance are a
rewarding target for attackers.
M23 One can be too unimportant to be attacked.
